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Lessons from the Multilateral Trading System for
Reforming the Architecture of the International
Environmental Regime*
by Thomas Cottier, Manfred Elsig and Judith Wehrli
Recent studies on environmental regimes suggest that important lessons and policy recommendations may be drawn from the functioning of the multilateral trading regime.1 This
brief compares the needs and goals of the trade and environment regimes, and discusses
how insights from over sixty years of experience of the multilateral trading system might
provide ideas for redesigning the architecture of the international environmental regime. It
further calls for a better dialogue and improved complementarities between the two fields
in order to enhance coherence within international law.2

I. The trading regime

Multilateral cooperation in trade
has pointed the way towards
enhanced economic growth,
and in addition ensures
transparency and predictability
within the trading system.

Achievements of the trading regime
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) system, created following World War
II, ‘multilateralized’ bilateral tariff concessions between member states through the principle of most-favoured-nation (MFN) treatment. This principle meant that all participating actors enjoyed the same market access opportunities as those negotiated among the
dominant trading nations. The GATT system led to a substantial lowering of tariffs and thus
to an increase in trade in goods in the second part of the 20th century. During the last successfully concluded round of trade negotiations (Uruguay Round, 1986–1995), the regime
expanded in scope to include partial liberalization of trade in services and protection of
intellectual property rights, while trade in goods was further liberalized by tackling nontariff barriers and subsidies. In brief, the multilateralization of tariff and non-tariff policies
and law through the MFN principle entailed a progressive liberalization of trade in goods
and services.
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Increasing multipolarity: During the Uruguay Round, a
Transatlantic partnership between the US and the EU dominated the system, with Japan and Canada acting as systemically important middle powers supporting the Transatlantic
leadership. In recent years, we have witnessed the ascent of
a number of new economic powers, such as China (which
joined the WTO in 2001), Brazil and India.8 This structural
change creates new types of collective action problems and
brings actors with increasingly diverging economic and political interests to the core negotiations.

The creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995
established one of the most legalized dispute settlement systems in world politics.3 This system increased compliance with
international trade rules, and helped buffer against the protectionist tendencies particularly prevalent in times of economic
downturn. Based on the principle of non-discrimination, the
WTO provides for equal conditions of competition. Multilateral cooperation in trade has pointed the way towards enhanced
economic growth, and in addition ensures transparency and
predictability within the trading system.

Limits of consensus diplomacy: The consensus principle gives
a de facto right of veto to all WTO members. While the great
political cost of blocking decisions in political processes
means that in practice, it is only the large players which exercise this veto power,9 the WTO nevertheless cannot move
faster than the collective ambition of its members will allow.
In light of a substantial increase in (active) membership, the
consensus approach seems to have reached its limits, as the
multiplying number of potential veto players makes it difficult to achieve a balance of results which is acceptable to all
participating actors.

Modes of negotiation
Historically, certain negotiation modes played a crucial role in
the development of the trading regime:
Limited membership: The GATT began with a limited membership of 27 states, and increased membership only over
a long period of time. The WTO comprises 153 members.
Universal membership does not exist currently, and would
only be achieved as the result of a long negotiation process.
Progressive liberalization: The structure and design of WTO
negotiations allow members to progressively extend market access in accordance with their development situation. The process of progressive liberalization is advanced
in each negotiation round through bilateral, plurilateral
and multilateral negotiations directed towards increasing
the general level of specific commitments undertaken by
member states.

Lack of effective graduation: The concept of graduation is
based upon the philosophy that while all members are
bound by general principles and rules, more detailed commitments should be commensurate with levels of social and
economic development and competitiveness on world markets.10 It builds upon the idea of individual commitments
listed in schedules for goods and services, and applies it to
non-tariff barriers and to trade remedies more generally. Although the WTO Agreements contain provisions on special
and differential treatment with special rights for developing
countries, the WTO lacks an effective graduation system for
changing the status of developing countries and countries in
transition.

Consensus principle: Although the WTO Agreement sets
out detailed voting rules, they are not applied even when
consensus fails. Instead, negotiations are undertaken in
formal and informal committees and decisions reached on
the basis of consensus of those Parties that are present at a
meeting.4
Package-deal negotiations: Package deals entail indivisibly
bundling together sets of issues in ways that are acceptable
to all members. However, heavy packages may result in defensive posturing by negotiators, as countries often face pressure from domestic interest groups to veto certain proposals
where their “national interests” are at stake.5 Package-deal
negotiations are typical of multilateral trade rounds and
were crucial for the creation of the WTO, where countries
had to accept (with some exceptions) all key agreements in
order to join the new organization.6

Legalization: The establishment of the WTO’s highly legalized dispute settlement system has had a significant impact
on the relationship between rule-making and adjudication.
During the ‘legislative’ stage of negotiation rounds, decisions are still taken by consensus, but there is no power of
veto in the ‘adjudication’ stage of dispute settlement, where
members are subject to majority ruling (negative consensus). Decisions taken in the process of dispute settlement
are difficult to review in succeeding legislation. Realising
that this structure means decisions on international trade
law have long-term implications, a growing number of participants have adopted more pre-emptive defensive tactics
and posturing in trade negotiations.11 A balance could be
restored by enhancing the potential for legislative action
and response, for instance by introducing a hierarchy of
sources of law within the WTO, with a number of regulatory levels and varying rule-making processes.12

Critical mass approach: Critical mass negotiations are sectoral initiatives leading to plurilateral agreements, whereby
only those WTO Members that together are responsible for
a major percentage or ‘critical mass’ of world trade in a specific market take on new obligations.
Current challenges of the trading regime
In spite of the successes that have been achieved in the trading
regime, further progress on negotiations has been stalled since
the so-called Doha Round started in 2001.7 The reasons for this
are manifold:

Fragmentation: In light of the difficulties with current negotiations on the Doha Development Agenda trade round, many
members have turned their attention to “new regionalism”.
They are actively exploring partial liberalization of markets
2

… the incentive for those affected by environmental measures to engage
is inherently limited, as benefits are shared with the public at large…

and related economic objectives through other avenues
such as bilateral preferential trade agreements (PTAs) or
sector plurilateral agreements (e.g. the Anti-Counterfeiting
Trade Agreement (ACTA)). The proliferation of such agreements has led to a fragmentation of authority in the previously fairly centralized trade regime.

and the natural environment. Its objectives include pollution
control and mitigation, preservation of natural habitats, sustainable use of resources and sound waste management. Its
subject matter directly affects economic and developmental
issues, such as adaptation to climate change, land use or infrastructure, and forms therefore an immanent part of sustainable
development.

II. Comparing trade and environment

The goals of environmental law are long-term and deal with
public or common goods, both of which are non-excludable in
nature.14 The advantages these goods provide generally benefit
all concerned, and therefore the incentive for those affected
by environmental measures to engage is inherently limited, as
benefits are shared with the public at large – in short, environmental goods often present a commons-type problem. Operators subject to environmental regulation generally do not obtain particular benefits in return (although it may be argued
that such regulations may foster long-term competitiveness in
the industries affected).

Seeking to apply lessons from the multilateral trading system
to environmental law and policy begs a basic question – to
what extent is the nature of rules and commitments in the two
spheres comparable, and to what extent therefore can these issues be dealt with in a comparable manner?
The excludable nature of international trade regulation
The multilateral trading system has been built with the aim of
creating a level playing field.13 It is politically based on reciprocity, with all parties required to make appropriate contributions
for negotiations to succeed. The motivation to engage in negotiations, or to refrain from engaging, is essentially commercial
interest. Enhanced market access is paid for, in a mercantilist
manner, with trade concessions offered on an MFN basis.

Prerequisites for interfacing trade and environmental
architectures
While the multilateral trading system does produce an important public good in terms of institutions and legal security,
trade diplomacy and the WTO system continue to be primarily
based upon the interests and incentives for members and their
industries to participate in the global system. The public good
produced is the aggregate of the individual interests at stake.
In the field of international environmental law, the situation is
exactly reversed. Measures and efforts to protect the environment primarily entail the production of public goods at different levels of governance. Individual benefits are ancillary, and
are not the driving force behind the pursuit of the defined goals.
Environmental law does not exclude the provision of particular
incentives in terms of advantages in competitiveness, but the
industries concerned often consider environmental regulation
to be a burden, as they would presumably bear costs for the
benefit of the public at large. In the absence of clear particular
self-interests and drivers to engage, motivation to participate
in an environmental law regime depends, to a large extent, on
appeal to a sense of ethical and social responsibility.

Negotiations on tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade all follow the same patterns of interfacing the import and export
interests of domestic industries. Governments, moreover, are
subject to clear external pressures, which often allow them to
make decisions which would be impossible in a purely domestic context.
International trade law and trade regulation deal with excludable goods and services, and so are based upon privileges obtained in the process of negotiations and especially reflecting
particular interests of industries; whereas the overall system
offers the quality of a global public good, providing legal security and protection against state failures and arbitrary discrimination.
The non-excludable nature of international environmental
law
International environmental law, on the other hand, is mainly
concerned with the regulation of the interaction of humanity
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The environmental regime’s recourse to multiple policy tools
International environmental law currently employs a host of
different instruments, entailing both financial programmes
and regulation. Regulation employs a panoply of different tools,
including principles, guidelines, prohibitions, charges and
taxation, conditions, tradable and non-tradable permissions,
licensing, monitoring, product and process standards, and
technical norms.15 Apart from fundamental principles, such as
‘polluter pays’ or the precautionary principles, international
environmental law largely applies existing legal instruments
in the pursuit of its goals. Due to the vast variety of available
policy tools, the mode of implementation of new environmental obligations is often uncertain at the time of their adoption,
an uncertainty which may give negotiators and interest groups
pause. Many of the instruments deployed are instruments of
trade policy, such as export or import restrictions, product and
process standards, transparency, and regulation of services.
Emissions trading deploys financial instruments, and transfer
of technology and knowledge has implications for intellectual
property rights. Overall, international environmental law is
strongly interlinked with international economic law. Its recourse to trade instruments – as opposed to trade goals – explains the complex interface between the two fields, and why
these tools often fall under the jurisdiction of trade panels and
the Appellate Body of the WTO.16 Its cross-cutting nature also
explains why international environmental law is inherently
fragmented and has not so far lent itself to being concentrated
under the umbrella of a single international organization.

work Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), climate policy
is likely to be focused on regional, national and local measures
and initiatives. These measures may entail border tax adjustment, carbon tariffs on highly polluting products, or recourse
to countervailing duties in relation to subsidy programmes.
The offer by a country to abstain from taking unilateral trade
measures may serve as incentive to other countries, that have
not yet committed to climate policies, to participate in a multilateral system on climate change.18 Membership would bring
them legal security and predictability, and thus offer them
more than just the production of a global public good (in terms
of climate change mitigation) from which they could benefit
anyway as free-riders.
Lessons may also be drawn from the challenges currently faced
by the multilateral trading system. The trade regime’s deficiencies are to a great extent ascribable to an important shift of
power in world diplomacy. This stems from the rise of a number
of new economic powers, affecting the Transatlantic partnership and traditional negotiation structures. The international
environmental regime faces similar challenges with regard to
these structural changes. They might therefore be tackled in a
similar way:19
Multipolarity: Highly divergent interests in a multipolar
world are a concern in international environmental negotiations as well. A critical mass approach would, in combination with the polluter-pays-principle, allow seeking solutions among the biggest polluters or countries consuming
the most resources, without negotiations being hampered
by small players demanding exceptions. In the climate
change regime, critical mass negotiations make sense for
mitigation issues, while negotiations on adaptation matters
obviously need to include developing countries. With regard
to sustainable public procurement, plurilateral agreements
among the big players could be an incentive for others to
join in.

III. Lessons for the environmental regime
Past successes in the trading regime have resulted from a combination of critical mass and bottom-up approaches, as well as
the use of incentives to overcome domestic resistance. These
approaches recognise that states essentially pursue national
interests and are not willing to commit to actions or regulation unless these interests are directly or indirectly served. One
major lesson from the trading system, therefore, is that multilateral approaches to the environmental architecture need to
focus on identifying excludable national interests which may
be affected in different areas of environmental law and policy.
It is the imposition of particular disadvantages on those who
do not participate, or the granting of MFN-based privileges to
participating members, which creates the incentive to join international instruments focusing on the production of environment-related public goods.

Limits of consensus diplomacy: In most international environmental negotiations, decisions are usually taken by consensus. However, if negotiation rounds are about to fail in
spite of widespread agreement because consensus is unattainable, a fall-back strategy is needed, such as, for instance,
critical mass negotiations.
Lack of effective graduation: The idea of graduation aims to
account for the vast differences in social and economic development between countries, and is closely related to the
principle of common but differentiated responsibilities.
Rather than merely differentiating between industrialized
and developing countries, graduation could link substantial
obligations to objective indicators, such as a country’s absolute or per capita CO2 emissions.

The example of CFCs: The success of the 1985 Vienna Convention
for the Protection of the Ozone Layer and the 1987 Montreal Protocols (including the 1990 and 1992 amendments) in reducing
the use of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) in industrial production
and products is largely attributable to the fact that commitment
and compliance with the relevant provisions provided open market access, while abstainers faced barriers to trade in products
that were incompatible with the product standards agreed.17

Legalization: A high degree of legalization may render the
adoption of new agreements more difficult, since participants would only commit to what they are sure they are able
to comply with. On the other hand, this could lead to more
substantial outcomes. Compared to the highly legalized

The example of climate change mitigation: In the absence of an
international system based upon the United Nations Frame4

world trade regime, most multilateral environmental agreements lack strong compliance mechanisms and dispute
settlement systems.

tion (such as UNEP) that is provided with strong procedural
rights and the competence to mainstream environmental issues in existing institutions of other regimes, such the World
Bank, the IMF, the WTO, other UN Organizations, and the multilateral environmental agreements.

Fragmentation: In the absence of any hierarchy among different instruments of international law, including within international environmental law, it is important to clarify the
relationship between existent agreements and institutions,
particularly if there is an overlap in their thematic scope
or mandate. It seems crucial to avoid inconsistencies by
streamlining structures and enhancing central institutions
like UNEP, which plays an important interfacing and coordinating role.

V. Conclusion
The development of the multilateral trading system has been
remarkable for its rapid expansion in membership and scope,
and for the progressive liberalization of trade in goods and
services that was achieved under its auspices. Increased membership, however, entails a number of new challenges, including multipolarity, the need for effective graduation, and the
increasing difficulty and limitation of consensus diplomacy.
In order to surmount the slowdown in current negotiations,
negotiation strategies and voting procedures have to be reconsidered. The international environmental regime could benefit
from this review process by applying, where appropriate, the
more successful negotiation methods such as a critical mass
approach.

IV. Dialogue between the two regimes
To enhance coherence within the sustainable development
framework, it is important to improve the dialogue between international trade and environmental institutions. The concept
of the green economy, for instance, links economic growth to
environmental factors such as resource efficiency, low pollution or other environmental costs, and sustainable use of biodiversity and its components.20 The concept addresses trade-environment interfaces, and so can only succeed if convergence
can be developed between the two regimes at national, regional
and global levels.

While comparing the two regimes may give some ideas of
common challenges and possible approaches to surmount
them, differences between the two fields have to be taken into
account. Above all, the two regimes differ in their focus with
regard to the interests they protect, and their degree of excludability. When comparing the two regimes, it seems reasonable
to suppose that the identification of excludable goods and drivers in the field of environmental policy and law could create
incentives for states to join international instruments in that
field.

In fact, the multilateral trade regime is increasingly confronted
with environmental issues in areas such as process and production methods, labelling, or valuation of ecosystem services
and genetic resources. Its dispute settlement system cannot
address such issues in isolation, and instead has to take into
account parties’ obligations and commitments under environmental regimes.

Moreover, it is important to enhance the dialogue and coherence between the two regulatory areas in order to avoid tensions and inconsistencies. The institutional setup of international environmental governance would have to provide any
anchor institution with the necessary means to influence the
decision-making of other institutions, including the WTO,
when decisions have important environmental implications,
so as to ensure that all regimes function in a coordinated and
effective manner.

The legal nature of international environmental law, on the
other hand, calls for an architecture of horizontal legal integration. Since it uses legal tools pertaining to other areas of law,
efforts should be made to bring environmental concerns systematically into the relevant bodies in the process of consultation, decision-making and implementation. The environmental
regime needs to make sure that environmental agreements are
taken into account in other fora, in particular in dispute settlement. This could best be achieved through an anchor instituCOMPARING THE TWO REGIMES
Trade

Environment

Interest driven: market access and country-based benefits

Public goods approach

Focus on individual benefits; public good in terms of legal security

Focus on the creation of public goods, low priority of individual interests

Reciprocity in terms of political economy

Non-reciprocity

Responsive to domestic and foreign pressure

Responsive mainly to domestic pressures

Excludable nature of trade regulation (benefits limited to participants)

Non-excludable nature of environmental regulation (benefits for the
public at large)

Incentives to obtain market access and non-discriminatory treatment

Free riding; limited incentives to participate

Independent nature of the trade regulation system

Heavy dependence on funding and technical assistance

Strong institutions and legalization

Fragmented treaty system and weak compliance mechanisms
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